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Abstract
Chronic food insecurity and chronic poverty are closely related in Malawi. Since independence in 1964 national food security has been
a key policy objective. However, until the 1990s less emphasis was placed on the household dimensions of food security and its links with
chronic poverty. In the last decade a number of initiatives have been used in Malawi to tackle the issue of household food insecurity. One
of the most controversial has been the Starter Pack programme launched in 1998. Initially consisting of a free handout of packs of
improved maize seed, legumes and fertiliser to every small holder farm household in Malawi the scheme, under donor pressure, was sub-
sequently scaled down to become a form of targeted social safety net programme. This paper analyses the strengths and weakness of both
the original programme and its scaled down version and assesses the reason for the considerable opposition to the programme from
Malawi’s donor community. Although Starter Pack is no longer operative in Malawi the Malawian experience is used to derive lessons
for other countries where household food insecurity is an important dimension of chronic poverty.
 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Introduction
Chronic poverty is closely linked with both chronic and
transitory food insecurity in Malawi. Malawi is both one of
the poorest countries in the world and is densely populated.
This means that many farm households cannot aﬀord
inputs and do not have adequate land for their subsistence
food requirements. But as a landlocked country with poor
transport infrastructure, imports of the bulky staple food
crop maize are expensive such that the 80% or so of house-
holds who are net food consumers often cannot access
maize in the market at aﬀordable prices. The relationship
between chronic poverty and food insecurity is bi-direc-
tional and can often lead to the establishment of a vicious
circle. The chronically poor are often the most vulnerable
to food insecurity – particularly exposed to food insecurity
hazards as well as having limited coping mechanisms to
deal with such hazards. Food insecurity in turn can further
deepen poverty, not just in terms of negative nutritional
eﬀects on health and livelihoods but through the use of
coping mechanisms such as asset sales which make it
harder for families to lift themselves out of the poverty
trap.
As a result of the above, food security is a persistent pre-
occupation of all those involved in Malawi’s development
eﬀorts. Government, donors and non-governmental organ-
isations (NGOs) all acknowledge that a large proportion of
Malawi’s population remains chronically food insecure and
that until this issue is addressed the broader process of
development will be thwarted. Likewise, many agree that
past government and donor eﬀorts to overcome chronic
food insecurity have failed to bring about a signiﬁcant
improvement (Oygard et al., 2003, p. v; World Develop-
ment Movement, 2002, p. 10). Here, however, consensus
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seems to end. Within both the donor and government com-
munities a spectrum of views exists as to how Malawi
should best tackle the issue of chronic food insecurity.
This paper provides an overview of food security
options for Malawi from both a theoretical and historical
perspective. Within this context it analyses the role of the
Starter Pack initiative, which was launched by the Malawi
government in 1998. Starter Pack consisted of a free hand-
out of a small pack of improved maize seed, legumes and
fertiliser to all small holder households in Malawi. The ini-
tial pack was enough to cultivate 0.1 ha of maize. Although
the principle aim was to introduce farmers to improved
technologies in a risk free manner as a production boosting
initiative it was also hoped that the pack would improve
food security. Food security was expected to be improved
both by increasing the number of months the average fam-
ily could feed itself and, as a result, reducing demand for
food in the market so as to reduce the consumer price.
The scheme however, attracted considerable criticism from
Malawi’s donor community and as a result under went a
number of transformations. The aim of this paper is to
assess the Starter Pack experience to draw lessons for food
security and more general agricultural development strate-
gies of both Malawi and other countries in the region.
Food insecurity and poverty in Malawi
An extremely low GDP per capita of $160 combined
with one of the most unequal income distributions in the
world – a gini coeﬃcient of 0.65 in the late 1990s, surpassed
only by Brazil and Namibia – means that poverty is both
pervasive and deep in Malawi. Estimates suggest that
64% of Malawians live in poor households and 36% in
ultra-poor households1 (Government of Malawi, 2004).
Given that the food share in the poverty line is over 80%
(see Table 1) it can readily be assumed that poverty and
food insecurity go hand in hand in Malawi. The Forum
for Food Security in Southern Africa has made the argu-
ment convincingly:
‘‘Given the high share of food in the poverty line, the
36% of the population (equating to over 4 million peo-
ple) below the ultra poverty line can be assumed to be
chronically food insecure: regularly unable to access suf-
ﬁcient food. Those below the poverty line but above the
ultra poverty line (a further 28% of the population
equating to 3.3 million people) are likely to experience
transitory food insecurity, i.e. to be unable to access
adequate food all year round” (FFSSA, 2004).
In other words over half of Malawi’s nearly 12 million
population are both poor and food insecure.
The close links between poverty and food insecurity in
Malawi can be explained by a variety of factors. Around
85% of the population work in agriculture, the majority
being small holders producing ﬁrst and foremost maize
for home consumption. However, intense population pres-
sure means that the average farm-holding for small holders
is less than 0.8 ha. Even with good maize yields, this is
inadequate to produce enough food to feed the average
family throughout the year. Reliance on rain-fed agricul-
ture with an increasingly variable single season rainfall,
plus extensive soil degradation over the past two decades,
means that maize productivity has been declining as has
maize production per capita. This has translated into
declining calorie intake per capita. Although maize produc-
tion has trended upwards over the last two decades (see
Fig. 1), population growth of 2% per annum has led to a
decline in per capita maize availability. For example,
between 1979 and 1989 maize production per capita fell
from 244 kg/per capita to 193 kg/per capita whilst by
2003 it had fallen to 184 kg/per capita. Low productivity
is compounded by the high cost of imported fertiliser, par-
ticularly since the removal of the fertiliser subsidy in 1994/
95, making it unaﬀordable to many farmers. The extremely
low levels of purchasing power in Malawi, poorly devel-
oped marketing systems and limited export potential make
rural livelihood diversiﬁcation diﬃcult for most of the rural
poor. Hence they are caught in a maize poverty trap,
unable to move beyond subsistence maize production and
constantly facing the threat of food shortages.
There is evidence that food insecurity, particularly tran-
sitory food insecurity, has been getting worse in Malawi. In
2001–2003 Malawi suﬀered a food crisis. This was mani-
fested in a six-fold increase in food prices, which left
around 3.5 million people food insecure. The crisis was
the combined result of climatic shocks, mis-management
of the country’s strategic grain reserve, poor crop estimates
and a chaotic delayed response in terms of maize imports
(Stevens et al., 2002; World Development Movement,
2002). However, the eﬀects on the Malawian population,
including starvation-related deaths, were more severe than
in neighbouring countries where a similar proportion of the
population had been aﬀected. In addition, although
Malawi suﬀered a maize production shortfall in 2000/
2001 and 2001/2002 compared to the previous two years,
production was close to the twelve year average and the
decline was nothing like the production shortfall of the
1991/1992 drought year (see Fig. 1). However, compared
to the early 1990s the eﬀects of the 2000–2003 crisis on wel-
fare and food security were much more severe. It would
seem therefore, that the Malawian population has become
more vulnerable to food insecurity. Vulnerability can be
seen as a function of exposure to hazard and the ability
to cope with hazard (Webb and Harinarayan, 1999). Over
the past decade and a half both the frequency of food secu-
rity hazards in Malawi – local climatic events, HIV/AIDs,
policy mistakes, price shocks – has increased whilst the
ability of the population to cope with such hazards – as
determined by their assets, social capital, degree of liveli-
hood diversiﬁcation – has declined.
1 Based on the 1997–1998 Malawian Integrated Household Survey using
a poverty line of MK11 a day (which is close to the standard dollar a day
measure) (Government of Malawi, 2004).
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Food security options for countries like Malawi
At the level of national aggregate food security Malawi
faces two options – relying on domestic production, i.e.
food self-suﬃciency, or relying on imports. These two
sources of food security are not mutually exclusive, in that
part of the country’s food requirements can be domesti-
cally produced and part imported. It seems clear that over
the past 10–15 years ‘Malawi has shifted from being a
nationally self-suﬃcient producer of maize in non-drought
years to being dependent on commercial food imports and
foreign assistance to achieve a national food balance’
(Oygard et al., 2003, p. 45). This poses a question to gov-
ernment and donors – should this trend be allowed to con-
tinue, perhaps even be encouraged, or should eﬀorts be
made to boost domestic food production to reverse or at
least ameliorate the trend?
Still at the level of national food security, if the import
route is favoured, then policies need to be in place to ensure
that foreign currency is available for food imports – either
by promoting exportable cash crop production or via a
process of industrialisation. To the extent that foreign
exchange earnings are inadequate for commercial food
imports, then food aid will be required.
If domestic production is the preferred route to national
food security then a variety of often complimentary poli-
cies can be employed to boost domestic food crop produc-
tion. These can include non-price policies such as
technology transfer to improve yields, extension work, free
inputs, infrastructure development, credit schemes and
market development. In addition price policies such as sub-
sidised inputs and attractive output prices for food produc-
ers who market their crop can also be used.
Regardless of whether the emphasis is on imports or
domestic production, vagaries in domestic production, in
exchange rates, import and transport costs, etc., make var-
ious forms of insurance policies desirable. These usually
consist of a strategic grain reserve and/or a ﬁnancial
reserve. Both may need to be called on if domestic produc-
tion is unexpectedly low and/or if import costs are unex-
pectedly high. More sophisticated forms of insurance
include weather insurance and commodity price hedging.
The above has brieﬂy sketched the main policy options
for achieving national aggregate food security. However,
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Fig. 1. Maize production in metric tonnes 1982/1983–2001/2002.
Table 1
Poverty lines for Malawi (at April 1998 prices)
Poverty line (MK) Food (MK) Non-food (MK) Ultra (MK) Food share of the poverty line (%)
Southern rural 7.76 6.53 1.23 4.65 84.1
Central rural 9.27 7.76 1.51 5.56 83.7
Northern rural 11.16 8.90 2.26 6.69 79.7
Urban 23.38 16.95 8.90 15.23 66.8
National weighted average poverty line 10.47 – – –
Source: ODI (2004, Table 6).
Note: MK=Malawi Kwacha.
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such an achievement is necessary but not suﬃcient to
ensure individual and household food security. A nation
may possess adequate aggregate food supplies, whether
domestically produced or imported; yet chronic food inse-
curity may persist amongst segments of the population.
Hence, policies need to be devised to ensure access to ade-
quate food by all people at all times. A range of policies,
many of them complimentary, is available to achieve this
objective. Food self-suﬃciency might be promoted at the
household level by trying to ensure that as many house-
holds as possible meet their own subsistence food require-
ments. This is a diﬃcult process which requires mainly
non-price interventions such as free input delivery as with
Starter Pack, extension services, improved technology and
price policies such as aﬀordable inputs and credit. Alter-
natively, a policy of livelihood diversiﬁcation might be
pursued (stressing farm and/or oﬀ-farm income sources)
so as to provide individuals with purchasing power, with
simultaneous market development to ensure market access
to food. Functioning markets are critical to enhanced
food security but many countries, particularly Malawi,
have been unsuccessful in simultaneously promoting food
security objectives and market development. Whatever
approach to household food security is taken it needs to
be complimented by some form of social safety net system
for asset poor households unable, at least in the short
term, to access market opportunities making them vulner-
able to chronic food insecurity. Fig. 2 presents a diagram-
matic representation of the above food security policy
options.
A cross cutting issue in discussions of both national and
individual food security strategies, which has dominated
the donor-government discourse in many countries in East-
ern and Southern Africa, is the relative role of the state ver-
sus the private sector in any of the above policy options.
The debate between government and donors in Malawi
regarding food security strategies has for years, if not for
decades (Harrigan, 2003), been dominated by the issue of
the relative role of government and the private sector.
Arguments over the future of the small holder state mar-
keting board ADMARC, and over the National Food
Reserve Agency (NFRA) and who should manage the stra-
tegic grain reserve have diverted attention away from the
more fundamental issue – how to tackle the country’s
extensive chronic food insecurity. A more sensible
approach would be to develop a consensus around a viable
food security strategy (i.e. imports, domestic production,
food crop diversiﬁcation, subsistence production, liveli-
hood diversiﬁcation) and then to work out the complexities
of the respective roles of government and the private sector
in implementing the strategy and how these roles might
evolve over time.
The above outline of food security options provides us
with an analytic framework to help understand the donor
and government debates surrounding the free input Starter
Pack programme in Malawi. On the one hand there are
those donors, such as USAID, who saw the Starter Pack
as a waste of money that threatened to lock Malawian
small holders into a maize poverty trap. Such donors envis-
aged appropriate food security policies to consist of liveli-
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Fig. 2. Food security strategies.
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hood diversiﬁcation with small holder export cash produc-
tion being used to earn foreign exchange to purchase part
of the country’s food requirements in the form of imports.
Under such a scenario Starter Pack money should be used
instead to promote cash crop production and move small
holders away from dependence on maize. On the other
hand donors such as DFID as well as the Malawi govern-
ment itself have argued that the USAID model is not a cost
eﬀective use of resources. Malawi is a landlocked country
with poor domestic and regional infrastructure giving rise
to a high import parity cost of maize. It has been estimated
that the marginal cost of an extra tonne of maize in Malawi
is US$400 if brought in as food aid, US$200 or more if
commercially imported from neighbouring countries,
US$150–US$150 if grown by small holders in a good har-
vest year and less than US$50 if grown by Malawian farm-
ers making good use of Starter Pack (Levy, 2005). These
marginal cost measures suggest that domestic maize pro-
duction is a cost eﬀective route to food security and that
shifting resources to cash crops will have a high opportu-
nity cost in terms of the cost of imported maize.
Food security policies in Malawi since independence
Between independence in 1964 and the late 1970sMalawi
experienced rapid rates of economic growth based on an
agricultural-based exported-orientated development strat-
egy. The engine of growth was the estate sector2 exporting
tobacco, tea and sugar. Life President Banda also placed
national food security via self-suﬃciency high onhis populist
political platform. This was achieved via emphasis on small
holder production of maize. The strategy received strong
support from the state in the form of the state marketing
board ADMARC, which oﬀered small holders subsidised
maize seed and fertiliser and purchased the maize output at
guaranteed pan territorial prices. ADMARC also sold the
maize in the domestic market at subsidised consumer prices.
The losses it made on its maize trading account were cross
subsidised by proﬁts it made by buying small holder export
crops, such as tobacco, cotton and groundnuts, at producer
prices well below export parity, and then exporting.
In terms of achieving national aggregate food security
the post-independence policy was a success. Throughout
most of the 1960s and 1970s Malawi was food self-suﬃcient
and in many years had a surplus of maize to export to the
region. However, the overall agricultural strategy was such
that whilst the estate sector grew at over 17% per annum,
small holder growth was less than 3%.3 Essentially, the
small holder sector was used to provide cheap labour and
food to the estate sector whilst small holder land was also
annexed by the estates and proﬁts made by ADMARC on
small holder export crops channelled into the estates (Harr-
igan, 1988). Consequently, although data is sparse, it seems
that during this period many small holders became increas-
ingly impoverished – evidenced for example by the small
holder labour transfer to the estates despite a 6% per annum
fall in real labour earnings in the estate sector (Kydd and
Christiansen, 1982). This was exacerbated by the regime’s
general neglect of distributional and poverty issues, with
public expenditure, for example, prioritising the productive
rather than the social sectors. Hence, although national
aggregate food security was achieved, individual household
food security was not guaranteed.
The 1980s saw a reorientation of agricultural policy in
Malawi, largely under the auspices of World Bank and
IMF structural adjustment and stabilisation programmes.
Liberalisation in the agricultural sector initially took the
form of increasing ADMARC’s producer prices for small
holder export crops whilst reducing the relative producer
price of maize. At the same time subsidies on small holder
fertiliser and seed were phased out. The objective was to
remove price distortions and to increase the small holder
contribution to export earnings. Despite strong objections
from many in the Malawi government that such policies
would lead to declining food production, the issue of
national food security did not seem to be of central impor-
tance to the Washington-based multilaterals (Kydd and
Hewitt, 1986, p. 357; Harrigan, 2001, p. 94–5). The pricing
policy, combined with market liberalisation in the form of
the closure of many ADMARC markets, did indeed lead to
a national food crisis, such that by 1987 the government
was forced to import MT 140,000 of maize – the highest
import level since the early 1970s (Harrigan, 1988). In sum-
mary, the Government’s focus on national food security at
the expense of individual household security during the
1960s and 70s followed by a degree of donor neglect of
food security issues during the 1980s, meant that by the
early 1990s both household and national food security
had become more precarious in Malawi (Chilowa, 1998;
Sahn et al., 1990; Hawksley et al., 1989).
The 1990s witnesses a fairly ad hoc series of policy initia-
tives to boost small holder productivity and output along
with a belated acknowledgement that the bias towards an
increasingly ineﬃcient estate sector needed to be dealt with.
However, although increased small holder stratiﬁcation and
impoverishment as well as food insecurity were accepted as
important issues,4 policies were implemented in the absence
of a clearly articulated food security strategy.
The policies of the 1990s involved diversifying small
holder income sources, in particular by removing restric-
tions that had prevented small holders from growing
2 In Malawi the distinction between estates and small holder farmers is
based on land type not farm size. Estate producers are those who farm
leasehold land whilst small holder producers are those who farm
customary land.
3 The estimates of GDP and small holder growth during this period are
subject to debate (Harrigan, 2001, p. 18–23) with some authors arguing
that subsistence production was seriously overestimated (Kydd and
Christiansen, 1982, p. 359).
4 President Muluzi, who came to power in 1994 following the country’s
ﬁrst multi-party elections, placed poverty alleviation high on the UDF
policy agenda.
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lucrative crops such as burley tobacco, as well as promoting
increased maize productivity via the spread of hybrid maize
with a return to subsidised inputs and credit. The govern-
ment was also forced, in a reactive ad hoc manner, to deal
with food insecurity at the household level. The 1992–
1993 Southern African drought reduced maize production
in Malawi by over 50% (see Fig. 1) and approximately
two thirds of the population registered for food assistance.
In addition to food aid, the government responded to the
crisis with the Drought Recovery Inputs Programme
(DRIP) which involved distributing free maize seed and fer-
tiliser to 1.3 million small holder households (Devereux,
1997). Apart from the drought years, the subsidies and free
input programmes in place between the late 1980s and mid-
1990s resulted in a sharp increase in maize hectarage5 and
the adoption of improved maize varieties, and many talked
of Malawi’s delayed green revolution (Smale, 1995).
Despite the drought, which clearly exacerbated the
increase in poverty that was already occurring in rural
Malawi, and despite the initial green revolution success,
donors insisted that the government push ahead and
remove the fertiliser subsidies that had been reintroduced
in the late 1980s. Subsidies were dropped in 1994/1995
and this coincided with the collapse of the small holder
Credit Association (SACA).6 Consequently, by the mid-
1990s, although there had been a temporary post-drought
recovery, Malawi faced an underlying agricultural crisis.
Rural livelihoods were deteriorating (Frankenberger and
Luther, 2003), inequality among small holders had
increased (Peters, 1996), fertiliser prices had risen twice as
much as the maize producer price due to subsidy removal
and devaluation of the Kwacha, input use had declined
as had hybrid maize production (Orr et al., 2001). In addi-
tion, due to market liberalisation and the reduced role of
ADMARC in the maize market, intra-seasonal maize con-
sumer prices (between harvest and later in the year) were
widening. This adversely aﬀected the food security of small
holder households, most of whom were net food consumers
who were often forced to sell maize post-harvest at low
prices to meet cash needs and then buy back latter in the
year at much higher prices (Whiteside and Carr, 1997).
The coping strategies used by the most vulnerable house-
holds to deal with growing food insecurity, such as ganyu
labour7 and asset depletion further intensiﬁed the vicious
poverty-food insecurity cycle.
Between 1994 and 1997 further ad hoc initiatives were
introduced to try to deal with growing poverty and food
insecurity. In 1994–1995 the Supplementary Inputs project
(SIP) was introduced by the government, DFID and Action
Aid. The programme targeted around 800,000 small holder
families, predominantly in southern Malawi, and provided
hybrid maize seed and fertiliser as well as small amounts
of cassava and sweet potato cuttings and sorghum seed.
In addition, in 1995 as part of theWorld Bank Poverty Alle-
viation Programme, the Malawi Social Action Fund
(MASAF) was set up to provide targeted assistance to the
chronically poor. A key component of MASAF was public
works programmes in food deﬁcit areas involving self-tar-
geting food and cash for work (Devereux, 1997).8
One of the clearest failings of the above series of ad hoc
policy initiatives was that they were largely reactive. The
inability to put into place proactive policies to tackle pov-
erty and food insecurity was partly due the lack of a clear
food security strategy that commanded broad support.
Indeed, the situation was made worse by a lack of agree-
ment between government, donors and NGOs. The govern-
ment continued to favour national maize self-suﬃciency
using subsidised inputs to increase both output and produc-
tivity. Many donors, on the other hand, advocated market
liberalisation and small holder income diversiﬁcation via
the promotion of high value exportable cash crops, espe-
cially tobacco. Some donors, such as the World Bank and
USAID, pushed for rapid liberalisation and seemed impli-
citly to assume that diversion of land from food crops to
exportable cash crops could be compensated for by maize
imports, whilst other donors such as DFID and the EC
advocated a slower phased liberalisation with a focus on
food security implications and the need for social safety
nets. NGOs and the UN agencies placed much greater
emphasis on household food security via safety nets based
on free inputs and food aid. However, the impact was lim-
ited due to the fact that food aid was only able to treat the
symptoms not the cause of food insecurity whilst small-scale
input programmes had a limited impact (Frankenberger and
Luther, 2003, p. 25–26).
Starter Pack and its contribution to food security
It was in the context of the above confusion and grow-
ing evidence of a decline in soil fertility that the Starter
Pack was conceived. It is clear that in many ways the DRIP
and SIP programmes were the forerunner of Starter Pack.
In 1996 a Maize Productivity Task Force was established
to examine the technical and policy options for dealing
with chronic national food shortages, and Starter Pack
was one of the main recommendations. The Task Force
acknowledged that Malawi was facing a crisis of declining
5 The continued importance of maize is shown by the fact that by 1990
Malawi had the highest per capita maize consumption in the world.
6 SACA collapsed partly because during the multi-party election
campaign in 1994 the UDF had promised farmers that in return for their
vote they would not need to repay their credit and partly because the
1992–1993 drought led to asset depletion and inability of many small
holders to repay credit.
7 Ganyu labour refers to the provision of labour for families and friends,
often for payment in kind at very low rates. Devereux (1999) has argued
that this method of meeting food needs can often have a negative eﬀect on
longer-term food security of the ganyu labourer’s household by pulling
labour away from their own ﬁelds during critical times.
8 The MASAF public works programme has subsequently been
criticised for failing to consider the work burdens on women, and for
poor targeting, including exclusion of the most vulnerable (Frankenberger
and Luther, 2003, p. 27).
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soil fertility and maize productivity leading to national
food shortage and that fertility could only be restored by
the application of inorganic fertiliser. Starter Pack oﬀered
a solution in terms of ‘‘best bet” technologies for maize
production which were the result of ﬁve years of research
and ﬁeld trials (Levy, 2005, Chapter 1). The technology
consisted of providing all small holders with small packs
containing semi-ﬂint hybrid maize seed (2 kg), and fertiliser
(15 kg) as well as legumes (1 kg of seed) to improve soil fer-
tility. The pack was enough to cultivate 0.1 ha and it was
estimated that it would more than double maize yields.
As a result farmers would be able to produce an extra
100–150 kg of maize.
In terms of the food security policy options illustrated in
Fig. 2, Starter Pack was clearly a policy designed to
increase national food self-suﬃciency via non-price inter-
ventions to boost production. It was also a statist as
opposed to a free market approach. It was estimated that
with universal coverage (2.8 million packs) it would boost
domestic maize production by between MT 280–420,000
per annum, thus avoiding the need for maize imports and
contributing to the maintenance of the country’s strategic
grain reserve. Fig. 1 shows that in the two seasons in which
Starter Pack was universally distributed, maize output rose
considerably with a large part of the increase attributable
to the free inputs programme (see Fig. 3). Maize yields
were also signiﬁcantly higher in these years, although it
should be noted that rainfall was also high in these years
such that Starter Pack does not account for all of the
improvement. Indeed, over the past ten years it is only in
the production seasons in which government has inter-
vened through universal free input delivery (1998/99,
1999/2000, 2002/2003) that the country has been able to
produce a surplus or near surplus of maize.
Although Starter Pack focused on food self-suﬃciency
at the national level it also had the potential to signiﬁcantly
improve household food security. Firstly, by enabling each
small holder household to produce an extra 100–150 kg of
maize this provided an extra two to two-and-a-half months
of maize cover for a family of six.9 The importance of this
is seen by the fact that with an average small holder land
holding of 0.8 ha most small holder families are unable
to feed their family throughout the year from own produc-
tion. As shown in Table 2 in the three months before har-
vest (April–June) three quarters of households are without
their own maize, even in a good year. In addition, between
10% and 20% of the most chronically poor small holders
are food deﬁcit for nine months or more. Hence, an extra
two to two-and-a half month’s maize supply can have a
major impact on household food security.
The second manner in which Starter Pack contributed to
household food security was via its eﬀect on the maize con-
sumer price. By providing each household with several
month’s extra maize, demand for maize in the market
was reduced so dampening the intra-seasonal increase in
the maize consumer price. Hence, chronically poor families
who were forced to buy food were less crowded out by the
better oﬀ.10 Clearly, this price reduction eﬀect worked
largely via market demand rather than supplies to the
market.11
It is now widely accepted that household food security
has three key dimensions: food availability, food access
and food utilisation (ODI, 2004, p. 4). Starter Pack made
a clear contribution to both availability and access via its
output and price eﬀects. In addition, the inclusion of
legumes in the pack not only contributed to improving soil
fertility, but by diversifying sources of food also contrib-
uted to improved food utilisation. It would seem, therefore,
that the universal Starter Pack, the ﬁrst of its kind in
Malawi, oﬀered a fresh start to food security at both the
national and household level. By helping to address the
pressing problem of household food insecurity it also
promised to alleviate a key constraint that often prevented
the chronically poor from escaping the poverty trap.
Donor opposition and the evolution of Starter Pack to the
Targeted Input Programme (TIP)
Despite the above arguments, many of Malawi’s key
donors quickly came to view Starter Pack not as a fresh
start but as a false start. The ensuing disputes both
amongst the donor community and between donors and
government provide a sad example of poor donor behav-
iour (Harrigan, 2005). Criticisms ranged from the view
that: Starter Pack was undermining the development of pri-
vate sector input delivery; that it suﬀered from operational
and logistical weaknesses; that it was creating an inappro-
priate dependency on maize and contributing to what
USAID referred to as the ‘‘maize poverty trap” (Rubey,
2003) and that it was a costly programme which the gov-
ernment could not aﬀord. Following the scaling down of
Starter Pack to the Targeted Input Programme donors also
criticised TIP as being poorly targeted.
Given that Starter Pack seemed to oﬀer a promising
fresh start to food security in Malawi, and possibly for
other countries in the region, it is worth assessing the basis
of the donor opposition. It is important to note that in
some instances donor opposition was based on a dislike
of state interventionism in principle. In other instances,
opposition reﬂected an evolution of donor views on
appropriate food security strategies – this was particularly
9 Based on the FAO recommendation of 180 kg of maize per adult per
year and assuming this is halved for children.
10 The eﬀect of poor maize output on food prices was graphically
illustrated in the 2002 food crisis year where hungry season maize prices in
the Central Region, for example, rose to MK 45 per kg compared to the
norm of less than MK 15 per kg. It was high prices rather than lack of
food availability that led to hunger and starvation-related deaths in 2002–
2003.
11 Estimates from 2000 to 2003 suggest that only 10–15% of small holders
sold any maize (Levy, 2003).
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so in the case of the EC, the lead agency in the donor com-
munity on food security issues. When Starter Pack was
launched the EC, like the government, tended to focus on
maize production as the route to food security and this
was reﬂected in the ﬁrst EC Food Security Programme
(1997–2001). However, work on the EC’s second Multi
Annual Food Security Programme (MAFSP) saw a funda-
mental shift in the EC position towards a more holistic
food security strategy, focusing on livelihood diversiﬁca-
tion and food accessibility rather than simple food produc-
tion and supply. The EC strongly believed this gave it a
wider poverty focus orientated not just towards small hold-
ers but also towards the vulnerable landless or near land-
less.12 Within this context Starter Pack came to be seen
as an inhibitor of rural livelihood diversiﬁcation away from
maize production.
Donor opposition to Starter Pack on the grounds that it
undermined the development of private sector input deliv-
ery was most vocally articulated by USAID, who saw Star-
ter Pack as directly undermining its Agricultural Input
Markets Development Project (AIMS). Starter Pack was
centrally managed by a logistics unit and although trans-
port, warehousing and distribution was contracted out to
the private sector, USAID and other donors argued that
it was larger urban based operators who beneﬁted, which
both squeezed out rural input retail outlets and diverted
proﬁts back to the urban centres. However, supporters of
the programme have argued that the intention was quite
the reverse – Starter Pack was not designed to displace
commercial input delivery but rather to provide inputs to
those who may not have bought them, giving them experi-
ence with high quality inputs in a manner that would stim-
ulate commercial demand.
Another frequent criticism was that Starter Pack was
beset by operational problems such as late pack delivery,
inappropriate pack content and poor supporting extension
advice. However, many of these problems arose because
lack of donor ﬁnancial commitment and support for the
programme meant that it never became institutionalised
within the government’s public expenditure plans. As can
be seen from Table 3 donor funding was patchy and unre-
liable, DFID being the only donor to oﬀer consistent sup-
port to the programme (for which it often received harsh
criticism from other donors).
The donor argument that Starter Pack created maize
dependency leading to a maize poverty trap was based on
the perceived need for rural livelihood diversiﬁcation. It
was argued that the route out of food insecurity and pov-
erty required diversiﬁcation into non-maize food crops,
into cash crops and into oﬀ farm income sources. There
is some evidence to support this view in that those Districts
with the greatest dependence on maize had the greatest
number of food insecure households during the 2001–
2003 food crisis (Levy, 2003, reported in ODI Fig. 2). A
12 The new EC approach consisted of ﬁve components. (1) Increased
government ownership of food security policy via the break-up of the EC
Food Security Unit with staﬀ distributed to the Ministries of Agriculture
and Finance. (2) Replacing APIP (Agricultural Productivity Investment
Programme) as a provider of credit in kind with an institution to provide
micro credit to ﬁnance a wider range of players including those wishing to
invest in micro, small and medium enterprises. (3) Increased emphasis on
oﬀ-farm sources of income with the creation of a public works scheme –
The Employment Generation Scheme Support (EGSS). (4) Support for a
wide range of NGO activities focusing on livelihood diversiﬁcation. (5) A
safety net programme for the severely malnourished ultra poor located
outside mainstream food security programmes.
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Fig. 3. Maize production (main season).
Table 2
Months of maize deﬁcit for small holder farmers
2000–2001
(% of farmers)
2001–2002
(% of farmers)
2002–2003
(% of farmers)
9 months or more 10 17 22
6 months or more 32 52 50
3 months or more 72 87 82
No deﬁcit 5 3 6
Source: 2001, 2002 and 2003 TIP evaluation surveys.
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more general criticism of promoting household maize pro-
duction via hybrids is that Malawi is beset by small and
declining farm size (Kutengule, 2000) and declining soil fer-
tility. This has led many to argue that hybrid maize pro-
duction cannot solve the food security problem for large
numbers of families holding less than 0.5 ha of land. At
best it can provide an extra two to three months food cover
above the three to four months provided by tradition maize
varieties (Devereux, 1997). Consequently encouraging
small holders to focus on maize production via free input
programmes inhibits them from moving into higher value
crops and activities and so condemns them to perpetual
poverty. The validity of this critique depends upon the
viability of a food security model that does not rely on
household food self-suﬃciency and may even require aban-
doning the national self-suﬃciency approach in favour of
imports. The extent to which Malawi is ready for such an
approach will be discussed below.
The donor critique that Starter Pack was costly and
unaﬀordable seldom involved consideration of the cost of
alternative strategies to improve household food security.
Estimates suggest that in the absence of intervention
Malawi faced a food deﬁcit of between 500,000 and
600,000 MT per annum in the early 2000s (Levy, 2005,
Chapter 2). If Starter Pack is to be rejected as too costly
an intervention, then cheaper policies to ensure food secu-
rity are necessary. The comparisons, however, are not
favourable. The universal Starter Pack had a ﬁxed cost of
around $20–25 million per annum. By contrast rough esti-
mates calculated in Levy (2005) Chapter 8 suggest that a
general fertiliser subsidy would have cost at least as much
and would also beneﬁt estate farmers, which include com-
mercial farmers and medium sized graduated small holders.
Required maize imports in the absence of the universal
Starter Pack would have cost $70–100 million, food aid
around $100 million and welfare transfers to the 30% of
chronically poor households around $107 million. Indeed,
the costs of failing to achieve food security, not just in
terms of ﬁnancial costs, but also in terms of the resulting
macroeconomic instability, were clearly illustrated in the
2001–2003 food crisis. However, these costings are not sta-
tic, and the recent growth in cheap maize imports in the
form of cross border trade from Mozambique suggests that
the pursuit of national food self-suﬃciency through pro-
grammes such as Starter Pack, may perhaps no longer be
the most viable route to food security, a point which will
be taken up in Section ‘Support to input access and the
future of Malawi’s food security policies’.
The evolution of Starter Pack to the Targeted Input
Programme (TIP)
Table 3 shows that in 1998 and 1999 the government
contributed half of the total cost of the universal Starter
Pack programme – partly via the use of the government
fertiliser stock. However, from 2000 onwards, govern-
ment’s contribution fell steadily from over 50% to under
10%. This was due to IMF pressure to restrict the govern-
ment’s contribution to under $2.5 million as part of the ﬁs-
cal austerity programme. The higher share contributed by
donors such as the EC, gave the donors more leverage over
the form of the programme, which in 2000 was scaled down
to TIP. Most government oﬃcials seem to agree that it was
largely due to donor pressure that Starter Pack became
TIP. Although initial objections to the programme had lar-
gely focused around ﬁscal cost, within a few years donors
were articulating a wide range of objections to the original
programme. These objections coincided with an evolution
of donor food security policies towards a more holistic live-
lihoods approach as well as an elevation of the social safety
net programme in Malawi. Hence, donors were willing to
endorse a scaled down free inputs programme and to recast
it in the light, not of a production enhancing technological
transfer, but as one of many targeted social safety nets,
albeit not necessarily the most eﬀective. However, this com-
promised the original aims of the programme:
‘Alas, this small holder productivity programme was
hijacked by the donor determination to transform it into
a safety net programme, targeted to the poorest. . .The
shift to safety net also muted the focus on productivity.
Composite maize with lower gearing (maize/nitrogen)
was substituted for the hybrids. . .The African solution
was distorted substantially as ﬁltered through donor
lenses – targeting replaced universal coverage; an
untested system was substituted for a proven one.’
(Member of original Maize Productivity Task Force).
Table 3
Financing of starter pack/TIP ($US million)
Year GoM DFID WB EC Norad IFAD RoC Libya Total GoM %
1998 14.5 8.2 1.7 0.7 0.5 25.6 56
1999 12.5 4.3 7.2 1.2 25.2 50
2000 2.3 2.8 1.5 0.9 7.6 31
2001 2.4 3.6 1.2 7.2 33
2002 1.3 9.9 2.2 13.4 9.5
2003 1.2 10.9 12.1 10
Total 34.2 39.8 8.9 3.5 2.2 1.2 0.5 0.8 91.1
Note: GoM = Government of Malawi; WB =World Bank; RoC = Republic of China.
Source: Starter Pack logistics unit records.
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After the donor decision to scale down Starter Pack was
made, the programme in the form of TIP, went through a
number of iterations. In 2000 agreement was reached to
scale down the programme in steps as other interventions
under the Malawi National Safety Net Strategy were grad-
ually introduced. In 2000–2001 1.5 million packs were dis-
tributed and in 2001–2002 1 million. The selection of
beneﬁciaries was based on a community targeting process
using vulnerability criteria derived as part of the Safety
Net work. However, it is now generally agreed that this tar-
geting process was both ineﬃcient and divisive (Levy and
Barahona, 2002).13 Following the food crisis of early
2002, the programme was scaled up in 2002–2003 to 2 mil-
lion donor funded packs and 800,000 government funded
packs in what was referred to as the ‘‘Extended TIP”.
The improved food situation in 2003 meant that the num-
ber of packs was again reduced to 1.7 million. Table 4 pro-
vides a summary of Malawi’s free input distribution
schemes since 1992, including the various iterations of Star-
ter Pack/TIP. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss
the extent to which the scaling down of Starter Pack con-
tributed to the 2002 food crisis. It is now accepted that
the crisis had a wide range of diverse causes (Stevens
et al., 2002; World Development Movement, 2002), but
undoubtedly, the move to TIP played a part.
Support to input access and the future of Malawi’s food
security policies
A near universal TIP was implemented at the last min-
ute for 2004–2005, but this was largely due to political fac-
tors.14 Subsequently, the debate about Starter Pack in
Malawi has been eclipsed by the debate about fertiliser sub-
sidies, which have been in place for the past two seasons.
Political parties have been competing to promise voters dif-
ferent types of subsidy programmes whilst donors initially
started oﬀ with varying degrees of opposition to subsidies
which reﬂected their earlier positions on Starter Pack.
More recently however, as Government has proved deter-
mined to press ahead with subsidies, donor positions have
started to soften and the Malawi subsidy programme is
attracting considerable interest, as did the earlier Starter
Pack programme.
This softening of positions reﬂects a new donor pragma-
tism. However, there still exists considerable division of
opinion regarding the longer-term approach to food secu-
rity that should be adopted in terms of the options illus-
trated in Fig. 2.
Given that the original universal Starter Pack and more
recently the fertiliser subsidies have made a substantial
contribution towards both national and household food
security in Malawi, how can we reconcile the diversity of
often strong views about ongoing support to input supply
for maize production in Malawi? The strongest and most
compelling objection to the continuation of such support
is that it will inhibit the process of rural livelihood diversi-
ﬁcation and as such condemn many small holders to a per-
petual maize poverty trap. This line of argument, also
associated with advocacy of a policy of rural livelihood
diversiﬁcation away from maize production and greater
reliance on imports from regional countries such as
Mozambique and South Africa by the private sector and
a scaling down of the strategic grain reserve, is well repre-
sented by the following quote from Rubey (2003):
‘Recognise that the single-minded pursuit of a policy of
maize self-suﬃciency is counter-productive and eﬀectively
condemns many Malawians to perpetual poverty. Malawi
is likely going to be a net importer of maize in the future,
but this need not be viewed as a failure. . .Past analysis
has suggested that the costs of maintaining a national grain
reserve that would be large enough to make up for a signif-
icant shortfall are simply too high and the potential bene-
ﬁts too low.’ (Rubey, 2003, p. 3–4).
However, it would be wrong to characterise the Malawi
government’s enthusiasm for ongoing support to input
supply for maize production as tantamount to a denial of
the need for livelihood diversiﬁcation. Both government
and external observers acknowledge that, in addition to
raising maize output via the introduction of high yielding
fertilised varieties, four other approaches to rural poverty
and food security also require serious consideration (Deve-
reux, 1997; Orr and Orr, 2001). First food security needs to
Table 4
Malawi’s free inputs programmes
Date Programme Number of beneﬁciaries
1992–1993 Drought Recovery Inputs Project 1.3 million
1994–1995 Supplementary Inputs Project 800,000
1995–1996 Supplementary Inputs Project 660,000
1998–1999 and 1999–2000 Starter Pack 2.8 million
2000–2001 Targeted Input Programme 1.5 million
2001–2002 Targeted Input Programme 1 million
2002–2003 Extended Targeted Input Programme 2.8 million
2003–2004 Extended Targeted Input Programme 1.7 million
13 Unfairly, donors subsequently criticised TIP as an ineﬃcient targeted
social safety net programme. However, the original Starter Pack was never
intended to be a targeted social safety net and only became so under donor
pressure.
14 During the 2004 election campaign, key politicians promised a return
to fertiliser subsidies. The 2004–2005 TIP was hurriedly and belatedly put
together as a cheaper, but politically palatable, alternative.
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be improved by diversifying food crops towards more
drought resistant and less nutrient demanding crops such
as cassava, sweet potatoes, groundnuts and beans and it
is clear that such a diversiﬁcation trend is already under-
way in Malawi.15 Secondly, cash crop production should
be promoted to improve food security by increasing house-
hold purchasing power. In Malawi this entails the promo-
tion of traditional small holder crops such as tobacco and
cotton, as well as new high value crops such as spices, fruit
and vegetables and soybean. Thirdly, there is a need to pro-
mote the growth in non-farm income as the route to liveli-
hood diversiﬁcation and improved food access (Orr et al.,
2001). This would involve the promotion of micro and
small-scale enterprise such as beer brewing, food process-
ing, furniture making.16 Finally, especially if food produc-
tion is scaled up to more productive larger farmers, income
earning opportunities in the form of wage labour on such
farms oﬀers another route to both increasing national food
production and increasing purchasing power at the house-
hold level.
Despite acceptance by all parties on the need for rural
livelihood diversiﬁcation, the diﬀerences of opinion on
the role of support to input supply for maize production
in such a process can perhaps be explained by diﬀerent time
horizons and perception of risk. Many donors articulate an
essentially long-term vision of food security in Malawi,
involving diversiﬁed food production, increased small
holder cash crop production and increase in oﬀ-farm
income with well developed private markets enabling indi-
viduals to utilise their increased purchasing power to access
food. In such an environment, they see no need for the
handout of free inputs except perhaps as a very limited
form of safety net for the most vulnerable. Most in govern-
ment share this vision, but are acutely aware that it is a
long-term vision, which will need to be preceded by a very
tricky, protracted and risky transition phase. Government
oﬃcials are extremely concerned about the food security
risks during the transition and see support to input supply
for maize production as having a role to play as a produc-
tion enhancing intervention.
One aspect of Government risk aversion is the reluc-
tance to see maize imports as a major component of food
security. Malawian politicians and government oﬃcials
have long been wary of a strategy that puts too much
emphasis on food imports. A decade and a half of civil
war in Mozambique cutting oﬀ landlocked Malawi’s most
direct access to the sea has engendered an almost siege
mentality, which still persists despite the ending of hostili-
ties in her neighbour. Throughout the 1980s and early
1990s large strategic grain reserves and fertiliser buﬀer
stocks, partially ﬁnanced by the EC, were a reﬂection of
this mentality. Even now, as a landlocked country with
poor transport infrastructure in neighbouring countries,
the viability of extensive reliance on bulky food imports
remains in doubt. The food crisis of 2001–2003 graphically
illustrated the logistical problems of estimating and correctly
timing food imports and dealing with transport bottlenecks
as well as the diﬃcult interactions between government
imports and private sector importers. In addition the
events of 2001/2002 showed that as a relatively small coun-
try in the sub-region Malawi is acutely exposed whenever a
regional food shortage occurs since its larger neighbours –
Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe – have ﬁrst call over food
imports by virtue of their greater size and purchasing power
and better connections with South Africa and overseas
markets.
However, the situation regarding maize imports has
evolved rapidly in the past few years. There is evidence of
signiﬁcant growth in quantities of informal maize trade
particularly between Northern Mozambique and Southern
Malawi at low prices (Whiteside et al., 2003).17 In the trade
years 2001/2002 and 2002/2003 between a third and a half
of Malawi’s maize imports were informal and in 2002/2003
alone it is estimated that MT 223,000 was informally
imported from Mozambique. If this trend continues there
may be a strong argument that part of Malawi’s national
food security strategy should rely on imports. If this is
so, the justiﬁcation for large-scale support to input supply
to boost domestic production becomes much weaker. A
pre-requisite for greater reliance on imports however, is a
well functioning and highly eﬃcient strategic grain reserve
to ensure national food security in years of regional pro-
duction shortfalls and possibly a ﬁnancial interest earning
reserve to enable purchases on world food markets. At
present, there is still debate about the size of Malawi’s stra-
tegic grain reserve and the manner in which it should be
operated by the newly formed commercial National Food
Reserve Agency.
Even if national food security is achieved via greater
reliance on imports, the issue of ensuring household food
security remains. A greater reliance on cheap maize
imports could potentially go hand in hand with the promo-
tion of rural livelihood diversiﬁcation away from maize
production. But the issue of risk and time horizons arises
again. The process of diversiﬁcation will be slow and many
of the most vulnerable may well not be able to participate.
In addition, it assumes well functioning and non-exploit-
ative food markets such that access to food at aﬀordable
prices is guaranteed. The key question, therefore, is will
15 Between 1990/91 and 1998/99 small holder production of millet,
pulses, beans, potatoes and cassava increased from MT 465,000 to MT
3,046,000 (Harrigan, 2003 Fig. 3).
16 There is strong evidence that such diversiﬁcation is occurring rapidly,
albeit from a small base. Between 1992 and 1999 the number of new
micro-enterprises increased ﬁvefold from 20,000 to 100,000 (Orr and Orr,
2002).
17 Low prices are due to the fact that average maize prices are lower in
Mozambique than in Malawi due to the former’s extensive methods of
production without the use of fertiliser. This is possible due to Mozam-
bique’s much lower population density and subsequent better soil fertility.
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Malawi’s nascent private sector be able to guarantee
imports and domestic food markets? If not, what role
should the government play in the transition process and
how can this be done in such a way that it does not inhibit
private sector development?
Finally, if the strategy of greater reliance on maize
imports and rural livelihood diversiﬁcation is adopted as
a long term objective it is absolutely essential that appro-
priate social safety nets are in place to protect the vulnera-
ble. It is generally accepted that support to input supply for
maize production is not the best way to oﬀer a food secu-
rity safety net and that in terms of targeting and eﬃciency,
public works schemes oﬀer a better alternative. However,
given the magnitudes of food insecurity and poverty out-
lined in Section ‘Food insecurity and poverty in Malawi’,
existing public works schemes will need to be massively
scaled up and other interventions designed for those such
as the elderly and the sick who are unable to participate
in such schemes.
On the other hand, if increased reliance on food imports
is deemed too risky, then the issue of boosting the produc-
tivity of domestic food production, especially maize pro-
duction is critical. The experience would suggest that a
universal Starter Pack or fertiliser subsidy oﬀers a viable
and cost eﬀective method of improving national food
self-suﬃciency whilst also having a strong positive eﬀect
on household food security.
Lessons from Malawi’s Starter Pack/TIP experience
Malawi is typical of many countries in sub-Saharan
Africa, with an agricultural sector dominated by poor, land
scarce and capital scarce small holders suﬀering from food
insecurity. Hence its experience with Starter Pack is of
relevance to other countries in the region.
Starter Pack was a successful production intervention
that helped achieve both national and household food
self-suﬃciency in Malawi. At the time when it was intro-
duced promoting national maize production seemed a
cheaper alternative than relying on maize imports. This sit-
uation now seems to be changing and it is possible that in
the future the most sensible strategy for Malawi will be to
place greater reliance on food imports whilst promoting the
process of rural livelihood diversiﬁcation. However, the
price of imported food remains critical to such a strategy,
and in the event of cheap imports from Mozambique prov-
ing temporary, the implication is that government would
need to fund a costly subsidy to keep the price of imported
food aﬀordable. Under such a scenario, support to input
supply for maize production again looks attractive.
If a universal Starter Pack is in future considered either
in Malawi or elsewhere, it is important to be realistic in
terms of what Starter Packs can and cannot achieve. If
properly implemented, they can improve food security at
all levels. However, although Starter Pack, by helping to
address the issue of household food security, may provide
a platform on which to build rural growth strategies, Star-
ter Pack itself should not be seen as a growth policy.18 At
best, therefore, Starter Pack is a pre-requisite for growth if
domestic food production is seen as the route to food
security.
Likewise, in terms of poverty reduction, Starter Pack is
not a panacea for poverty but rather a pre-requisite for
poverty reduction. It helps alleviate one key symptom of
poverty, namely food insecurity, but it cannot reduce
poverty in the sense of having a direct lasting impact.
Nevertheless, its indirect impact may be signiﬁcant – invest-
ments in health, education and rural development are
more eﬀective when people are not chronically or acutely
malnourished. The implication is that if boosting domestic
food production via Starter Pack is to be a key part of an
ongoing national food security strategy it needs to be com-
plemented by other longer-term programmes to address
poverty and boost rural growth. As such policies start to
produce a positive impact it may then be possible to con-
sider an exit from Starter Pack.
Other low-income agrarian countries can learn much
from Malawi’s experience with Starter Pack. Firstly, if a
universal free input programme is to be implemented it
needs to be clearly located within an overall national food
security strategy. The Malawian experience shows that the
latter is not static – as external circumstances change, e.g.
the cost of food imports, the appropriateness of the various
strategies outlined in Fig. 2 may likewise change. It is
important therefore not to get ‘‘locked in” to a particular
programme. Secondly, it is important to be realistic in
terms of what a Starter Pack programme can and cannot
achieve and in light of this to ensure that it is part of a
holistic development strategy that recognised the links
between food insecurity, poverty and low growth.
The conditions that made Starter Pack an appropriate
programme for Malawi in 1998 indicate the type of country
which may wish to emulate the policy. These conditions
have been outlined by Levy (2005): the staple food crop
is maize; soil fertility is low resulting in chronic underpro-
duction of food; food imports are costly, e.g. for land-
locked countries; and poverty is widespread and deep such
that few can aﬀord to purchase commercial inputs.
The discussion of Starter Pack in Malawi has also raised
some broader issues concerning food security strategies in
landlocked countries such as Malawi and the respective
roles of the state and the private sector. A strategy of
domestic food production using instruments such as Star-
ter Pack may not seem the most logical when scarce
18 When Starter Pack was initially conceived it was seen as part of a rural
growth strategy. It was hoped that the Starter Pack technology would
allow many farmers to become surplus maize producers and make proﬁts
as commercial farmers. Hence it was only seen as a ‘‘starter” in that once
commercialisation had occurred farmers would no longer need free inputs
but would be able to aﬀord them from commercial suppliers. However,
subsequent large increases in input prices meant that commercial maize
growing is clearly not viable for Malawian small holders even with
optimum yields (Van Donge et al., 2001) and Starter Pack can no longer
be seen as an important mechanism to stimulate rural growth.
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resources could be used to produce higher value export
cash crops and the foreign exchange earnings used to
import part of the countries food requirements. However,
such a strategy involves a long term vision of livelihood
diversiﬁcation with farmers producing cash cops and rely-
ing on a well functioning marketing system to access food
imports. Markets in countries like Malawi are far from well
developed and indeed the policies that governments intro-
duce in the interim to ensure food security often hamper
private sector market development. It is in the crucial tran-
sition stage away from state dominated maize production
towards more diversiﬁed market based livelihoods that
programmes such as Starter Pack may well have a role to
play as long as there are clear exit strategies and pro-
gramme operation does not unnecessarily undermine mar-
ket development.
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